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GOVERNING OF AGRARIAN SUSTAINABILITY1 
 
Hrabrin Bachev, Institute of Agricultural Economics, Sofia, Bulgaria 
 
Abstract 
 
The new developing interdisciplinary methodology of the New Institutional and 
Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral 
and Political Sciences) is incorporated into agrarian sphere, and a framework for governing of 
agrarian sustainability suggested. It takes into account the role of the specific institutional 
environment (formal and informal property rights, and systems of their enforcement); and the 
behavioral characteristics of individuals (bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, 
entrepreneurships, preferences, risk aversion etc.); and the transaction costs associated with 
protection and exchange of property rights; and the critical factors of each transaction (such as 
frequency, uncertainty, asset specificity, and appropriability); and the comparative efficiency of 
market, private, public, and hybrid governing modes. The discrete structural analysis is applied, 
and the principle forms for governing of transactions with specific critical dimensions specified. 
The cases of market and private sector failures are identified, and the needs for a third party 
(Government, international assistance etc.) intervention justified. The comparative advantages 
and disadvantages of different modes for public involvement (property rights modernization, 
regulations, taxes, assistance and support, public provision, hybrid modes) are assessed. The 
effective governance mix for public intervention in environmental transactions is presented. 
 
Key words: Agrarian Governance; Governing of Agrarian Sustainability; Efficiency of Market, Private, 
Public and Hybrid Modes; New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The governance of agrarian sustainability is among the most topical issues in academic, 
business, and policies debates in both developed and developing countries. Experience shows 
that countries achieve to a different extend the economic, social, environmental etc. goals of 
sustainable development. That is a result of specific governing structures which affect in 
dissimilar ways individuals behavior and lead to diverse actual performances. Despite that 
institutional aspects are largely ignored, and “normative” approaches dominate, and informal 
modes and transaction costs are not included into analyses. Consequently, the potential of 
market and private governing modes for the specific economic, institutional and natural 
environment in each country can not be properly assessed. Nor the effective modes for public 
(government, international assistance etc.) interventions in agrarian sphere designed.    
In this paper we incorporate the achievements of the new developing New Institutional and 
Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Orgnaization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral 
and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for governing of agrarian sustainability.  
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“Institutions matter” 
 
Institutions (“rules of the game”) determine individuals’ rights in society and the way the 
property rights2 are enforced (Furuboth and Richter, 1998; North, 1990). The spectrum of rights 
could embrace material assets, natural resources, intangibles, certain activities, labor safety, 
clean environment, food security, intra- and inter-generational justice etc. A part of the property 
rights are constituted by the formal laws, regulations, standards, court decisions etc. In addition, 
there are important informal rules determined by the tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical 
norms etc. The enforcement of the rights is done by the state or other mechanisms such as 
international pressure, community actions, trust, reputation, private modes, self-enforcement etc. 
The institutional analysis is not interested in de-jure rights but de-facto rights individuals and 
groups possess. For instance, “universal principles” of sustainable development were declared 
(1992 Rio Earth Summit) and accepted by most countries. However, the extend of adaptation and 
respect of related rights, and their practical enforcement vary significantly among countries.  
The specific institutional environment affects human behavior and directs (governs) 
individuals’ activities “in a predictable way” (North, 1990). It creates dissimilar incentives and 
restrictions for intensifying exchange, increasing productivity, inducing private and collective 
initiatives, developing new rights; decreasing divergence between social groups and regions; 
responding to ecological and other challenges. For example, (socially) acceptable norms for use 
of labor (employment of children, safety standards, minimum wages), plant and livestock 
(animal welfare, preservation of biodiversity, usage of GM crops), and environmental resources 
(water use rights; permissions for pollution), all they could differ even between various regions 
of the same country. Namely the specific institutional structure eventually determines the 
potential for and particular type of development in different communities, regions, and courtiers.   
Institutional development is initiated by the public authority, international actions (agreements, 
assistance, pressure), and private and collective actions of individuals. It is associated with 
modernization and/or redistribution of existing rights; evolution of new rights and emergence of 
novel (private, public, hybrid) institutions for their enforcement. For instance, the sustainability 
initially evolved as ”movements” and “new ideology” in developed countries (Edwards et al., 
1990). Afterward this “new concept” extended, and instituted in the body of formal laws, 
regulations and public support programs. Numerous initiatives of producers and consumers 
widespread being an important part of (pushing up) institutional modernization in the area.   
Diverse institutional environment contributes to a different extend to achieving economic, 
social, environmental etc. goals of sustainable development. If for instance, private rights are not 
well defined, enforced, or restricted, that would limit intensification of exchange and the overall 
economic development. Indeed the rights on major agrarian resources were not well defined 
during transition in Bulgaria and that led to domination of low productive, unsustainable and 
“gray” structures; and ineffective use of large national resources; and serious economic, social 
and environmental problems in rural areas (Bachev and Tsuji, 2001). The “tragedy of commons” 
is a classical example for importance of institutional structure (Hardin, 1968). When common 
ownership and “open access” to natural resources exists there are strong individual interests for 
overuse since private costs are not proportionate to private benefits. Consequently, low long-term 
efficiency (unsustainability) come out as a result of this form of organization. The “tragedy of 
commons” could be avoided by an alternative institutional arrangement - introduction of public 
regulation on exploitation (users quotas) or privatization of natural resources3.  
Thus “institutions matter” and analysis of sustainability are to be done in the specific 
institutional rather than in an unrealistic (“normative”, desirable) context. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
2 While lawyers distinguish between property and human rights, for the economists all rights are property 
rights (Furuboth and Richter, 1998). 
3 In the later case, a private agent will contract and control sustainable use of limited natural resources. 
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institutional aspect is commonly missing in most of suggested frameworks for analyzing and 
assessing agrarian sustainability. Accordingly, non-feasible norms rather than real-life 
arrangements are used as criteria – farming model in developed countries, assumption for 
perfectly defined and enforced property rights, effectively working public organizations, etc. 
Therefore, an analysis of structure and evolution of real or other feasible institutional 
arrangements for carrying out agrarian activities have to be included in the model.  
 
The costs of governance 
 
Transaction costs are the costs associated with protection and exchange of individuals’ 
rights. In addition to the production costs the economic agents make significant costs for: finding 
best partners for land, inputs, labor, finance supply and marketing; negotiating the conditions of 
exchange; completing (writing down) the contract; enforcing negotiated terms; disputing through 
court or another way; and adjusting or termination along with changing conditions of trade.  
Institutional framework and its development also impose transaction costs to individuals – 
for studying out and complying with various institutional restrictions, formal registration of 
contracts and entities, efforts to deal with bureaucracy etc. A good example is the current 
problems of many Bulgarian farms to meet new EU requirements (“institutionally determined” 
costs) related to new product quality, food safety, environmental, animal welfare etc. standards. 
Transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded rationality and 
tendency for opportunism (Williamson, 1996). Economic agents do not possess full information 
about the system (price ranges, trade opportunities, trends in development) and they have to 
spend to increase their “imperfect rationality". Individuals are also given to opportunism4 and if 
there is an opportunity for some of transacting sides to get non-punishably an extra rent from 
exchange he (she) will likely do so. Therefore, significant ex-ante and ex-post investments have 
to be made to protect transactions from hazard of opportunism. 
If transaction costs were zero then the mode of the governance would not be of economic 
importance, and individuals would manage their relations with an equal efficiency though free 
market, or through private organizations of different types, or in a single nationwide company. 
All information for the effective potential of transactions (exploration of technological 
opportunities, satisfying demands) would be costlessly available, and individuals would 
costlessly trade owned resources in mutual benefit until exhausting possibilities for increasing 
productivity, maximizing consumption, and sustainable development5.  
However, very often the high costs make difficult or block otherwise efficient (mutually 
beneficial) transactions. Textbook cases of “market failure” are connected with negative or 
positive externalities of agrarian activities. Here free-market prices do not reflect the effect on 
third party’s welfare and cannot govern effectively relations. Maximization of social output 
(welfare) is not achieved, and inefficient allocation of resources and unsustainable development 
arrives6. That necessitates a “Government intervention” to eliminate differences between social 
and private prices (“internalization of externalities” through taxes, norms, etc.).  
The problem of “social costs” does not exist in the world of zero transaction costs and 
well-defined private rights (Coase, 1960). Situation of maximum efficiency is always achieved 
independent of initial allocation of rights7. However, when transaction costs are significant, then 
                                                 
4 In two forms: pre-contractual ("adverse selection") and post-contractual ("moral hazard"). 
5 Currently there is a principle agreement (social contract) for global sustainable development. 
6 Hence farmers will over-produce “public bads” (noise, air, and water pollution) and under-produce 
“public goods” (rural amenities, ecological and cultural services; habitat for wildlife, biodiversity etc.). 
7 If the farmer has “right to pollute”, the affected agents would pay him a “bribe” to stop polluting. If the 
farmer does not have “right to pollute”, then he would pay a bribe to other agents to let him certain 
pollution. In either case, the welfare of all agents is maximized without any public intervention.  
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costless negotiation and exchange of rights is not possible. The initial allocation of property 
rights between individuals is critical for the overall efficiency and sustainability. Moreover, if 
rights on important resources are not well defined (e.g. rights on clean air and water) that creates 
big difficulties in effective allocation (unsolvable costly disputes between polluting farmers and 
neighborhood). Consequently, some essential activities (transactions) are not carried out at 
socially effective scale, and existing structures less contribute to sustainable development.  
Thus the type of governance becomes crucial since various modes give unequal 
possibilities for participants to coordinate transactions, and stimulate acceptable behavior of 
counterpart, and protect their contracted and absolute rights from unwanted expropriation. In the 
world of positive transaction costs the rational agrarian agents will seek, chose, and develop such 
modes for governing of their activities and relations which maximize their benefits and minimize 
their (production and transacting) costs. In the long run only efficient modes for governing of 
different transactions will prevail (sustain) in agriculture (Williamson, 1996).  
Sustainability of agrarian structures is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
sustainable development8. The overall goals of sustainable development cannot be automatically 
achieved through totally decentralized actions (free market competition, private initiatives). 
There is a need for special (designed and installed) governance which include a significant 
public (community, national, transnational, global) intervention in agrarian sector. 
There is not a singe (universal) mode for effective organization of all type of agrarian 
transactions in any possible institutional and economic surroundings. Individual governing forms 
have distinct features (advantages and disadvantages) to coordinate, stimulate, and protect 
transactions. Besides, agents have specific personal characteristics - awareness, 
entrepreneurships, preferences, risk aversion, tendency for opportunisms etc. Furthermore 
efficiency of governing mode will depends on the specific attributes of each transaction.  
Therefore, individual transaction in to be put in the centre of the analysis, and the comparative 
efficiency of the feasible modes for governing of socially desirable transactions assessed.  
 
Principle governance matrix 
 
Generally, every agrarian transaction could be governed through a great variety of 
alterative forms. For instance, supply of environmental preservation service could be governed 
as: a voluntary activity of a farmer; though private contracts of the farmer with interested or 
affected agents; though interlinked contract between farmer and a supplier (processor); though a 
cooperation (collective action) with other farmers and agents; though a (free) market or assisted 
by a third party (certifying and controlling agent) trade with special (eco, origins) products; 
though a public contract specifying farmer’s obligations and compensation; though a public 
order (regulation, taxation, quota); within a hierarchical public agency or by a hybrid form.  
Different governance modes are alternative but not equal modes for organization of 
transacting. The free market has big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible hand”, 
“power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit from specialization 
and exchange. However, market governance could be associated with high uncertainty, risk, and 
costs due to price instability, great possibility for facing an opportunistic behavior, “missing 
market” situation, etc. The special contract form (“private ordering”) permits better coordination, 
intensification, and safeguard of transactions. However, it may require large costs for 
specification of contract provisions, adjustments with constant changes in conditions, 
enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms, etc. The internal (ownership) organization 
allows greater flexibility and control on transactions (direct coordination, adaptation, 
enforcement, and dispute resolution by a fiat). However, extension of internal mode beyond 
                                                 
8 Sustainability of farms is one of the major criteria (indicator) for sustainable agrarian development. 
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family boundaries may command significant costs for initiation and development, and current 
management (collective decision making, control of the opportunism of the members of a 
coalition, supervision and motivation of hired labor, etc.). 
The discrete structural analysis is suggested to evaluate the comparative efficiency of the 
alternative governing forms (Williamson, 1996). Very often the direct assessment of related 
transaction costs is very difficult or impossible to make. Therefore, we first identify the “critical 
dimensions” of transactions responsible for the variation of transaction costs 9. When recurrence 
of transactions between same partners is high, then both (all) sides are interested in sustaining 
and minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding opportunism, building reputation, setting up 
adjustment mechanisms etc.). Besides, costs for development of a special private mode for 
facilitating bilateral (multilateral) exchange could be effectively recovered by frequent 
transacting.  
When uncertainty, which surrounds transactions increases, then costs for carrying out and 
secure transactions go up (for overcoming information deficiency, safeguarding against risk). 
Certain risks could be diminished by production management or through a special market mode 
(e.g. purchase of insurance). However, the governance of most transacting risk would require a 
special private forms - trade with origins; providing guarantees; using share-rent or output-based 
compensation; employing economic hostages; participating in a risk-pooling, inputs-supply or 
marketing cooperative; complete integration.  
Transaction costs get very high when specific assets for relations with a particular partner 
are to be deployed. Relation specific investments are "locked" in transactions with a particular 
buyer or seller, and cannot be recovered through "faceless" market trade. Therefore, dependant 
investment (assets) have to be safeguarded by a special form such as long-term contract, 
interlinks, hostage taking, joint investment, or ownership integration.  
Transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on products, services or 
resources is low. "Natural" low appropriability has most of the agrarian intellectual products - 
agro-market information, agro-meteorological forecasts, new varieties and technologies, 
software etc. Besides, all products and activities with significant (positive or negative) 
externalities are to be included in this group. If appropriability is low the possibility for 
unwanted (market or private) exchange is great, and the costs for protection of private rights 
(safeguard, detection of cheating, disputing) extremely high. The agents would either over 
produce (negative externalities) or under organize such transaction (positive externalities) unless 
they are governed by an efficient private or hybrid mode (cooperation, strategic alliances, long-
term contract, trade secrets, or public order).  
Secondly, we “align transactions (differing in their attributes) with governance structures 
(differing in their costs and competence) in discriminating (mainly in transaction cost 
economizing) way” (Williamson, 1996). According to the combination of the specific 
characteristics of each transaction, there will be different the most effective form for governing 
of transactions (Table 1). Agrarian transactions with good appropriability, high certainty, and 
universal character of investments (partner can be changed anytime without significant 
additional costs) could be effectively carried across free market through spotlight or classical 
contracts. Here organization of transactions with a special form or within the farm (firm) would 
only bring extra costs without producing any transacting benefits.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 “Frequency”, “uncertainty”, and “asset specificity” have been identified by Williamson (1996), and 
“appropriability” added by Bachev and Labonne (2000).  
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            Table 1. Principle Modes for Governing of Agrarian Transactions* 
Critical dimensions of transactions 
Appropriability 
                                  High Low 
Assets Specificity 
          Low           High 
Uncertainty 
       Low       High       Low       High 
Frequency 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
High  Low High   Low  High   Low  High   Low 
 
Free market h h    
Special contract form  h h    
Internal organization  h h   
Third-party involvement  K  K  
Public intervention    K 
  h - the most effective mode; K - necessity for a third party involvement 
* Differences in personal characteristics of agents are disregarded. Only extreme levels of critical 
factors of transactions are considered. In the real agrarian economy there is a big variation of 
critical dimensions and thus effective governing forms (including mixed, hybrid, interlinked etc.). 
 
Recurrent transactions with low assets specificity, the high uncertainty and appropriability, 
could be effectively governed through a special contract. The relational contract is applied when 
detailed terms of transacting are not known at outset (high uncertainty), and a framework 
(mutual expectations) rather than specification of obligations is practiced. Partners (self) restrict 
from opportunism and are motivated to settle emerging difficulties (situation of frequent bilateral 
trade). Besides, no significant risk is involved since investments could be easily (costlessly) 
redeployed to another use or users (no assets dependency exist).  
A special contract forms is also efficient for rare transactions with low uncertainty, high 
specificity and appropriability. Dependent investment could be successfully safeguarded through 
contract provisions since it is easy to define and enforce relevant obligations of partners in all 
possible contingencies (no uncertainty surrounds transactions). Here the occasional character of 
transactions does not justify their internalization within the farm (firm).   
Transactions with high frequency, big uncertainty, great assets specificity (dependency), 
and high appropriability, have to be organized within the farm/firm (ownership mode). For 
instance, managerial and technological knowledge is quite specific to a farm, and its supply has 
to be always governed through a permanent labor contract and coupled with ownership rights. 
Capital investments in land are to be made on owned (or long-leased) rather than rented land 
(high site and product specificity). All “critical” to farm material assets will be internally 
organized - production of forage for animals; important machineries; water supply for irrigated 
farming etc. While universal capital could be effectively financed by market form (bank credit), 
highly specific investments can be only made through internal funding (own funds, equity sell).  
According to the personality of resource owners and (transacting) costs of their coalition, 
different type of farm (agro-firm) will be efficient - one-person farm, family farm, partnership, 
cooperative farm, and corporative farms. Depending on the entrepreneurial capital, and the 
specific legal framework, support policies, tradition etc. various farms will have unlike effective 
horizontal and vertical boundaries10. Furthermore, an agrarian organization will be sustainable if 
                                                 
10 In transitional East European agriculture most investments happened to be in a regime of high 
dependency. As a result (over)integrated modes such as subsistence farming or large cooperatives and 
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it manages all transactions in the most economical for the owner(s) way (Bachev and Peeters, 
2005). If a farm does not govern transactions effectively, it will experience high costs and 
difficulties using institutions (possibilities, restrictions) and carrying out transactions comparing 
to other feasible organization. In that case, there will be strong incentives for exploring the 
existing potential (adapting to sustainable state) through changes in farm size, or via 
reorganization or liquidation of the farm (alternative use of resources). 
If specific capital cannot be effectively organized within the farm (economy of scale and 
scope explored, funding made), then an effective governing form outside farm-gates is to be used 
- group farming, joint ownership, interlinks, cooperative, lobbying for public intervention. When 
strong assets (capacity, time of delivery, site, branding) inter-dependency with an upstream or 
downstream partner exists, then it is not difficult to govern transactions through a contract modes 
(strong mutual interests for cooperation and restriction of opportunism). For instance, in 
Germany (and some other developed countries) the effective cooperative agreements between 
farmers and drinking water companies are widely used (symmetrical dependency) and led to 
production methods protecting water from pollution. However, very often farmers face unilateral 
dependency and need an effective (ownership) organization to protect their interests. Transacting 
costs for initiation and maintaining of such “collective organization” is usually great (big number 
of coalition, different interests of member, opportunism of “free-riding” type) and it is either 
unsustainable or do not evolve at all (Olson, 1969). That creates serious problems for efficiency 
(sustainability) of individual farms - missing markets, monopoly (quasi-monopoly) situation, 
impossibility to “induce” public intervention, etc.  
Third, we identify situations of market and private sector failures - the critical points for 
sustainable development. Serious transacting problems arise when condition of assets specificity 
is combined with high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability. Elaboration of a 
special governing structure for private transacting is not justified, specific investments are not 
made, and transactions fail to occur at effective scale ("market failure" and "contract failure"). 
Similar difficulties are also encountered for rare transacting associated with high uncertainty and 
appropriability. In these cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, authority) involvement in 
transactions is necessary (through assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make them more 
efficient or possible at all. The emergence and unprecedented development of the organic 
farming and system of fair-trade are good examples in that respect. There is an increasing 
consumer’s demand (price premium) for organic, semi-organic and fair-trade products in 
developed countries. Nevertheless their supply could not be met unless an effective trilateral 
governance (including an independent certification and control) has been put in place. 
When appropriability associated with a transaction is low, there is no pure market mode to 
protect and carry out transactions effectively. Nevertheless, respecting others rights (unwanted 
exchange avoid) or “granting” additional rights to others (needed transactions carried) could be 
governed by “good will” or charity actions of individuals, NGOs, or international organizations. 
A great number of voluntary environmental initiatives (agreements) have emerged by 
competition in food industries, farmers’ preferences for eco-production, and responds to public 
pressure for sound environmental management11. Environmental standards are usually “process-
based”, and “environmental audit” is not conducted by an independent party, which does not 
guarantee “performance outcome”. Therefore, most of these initiatives are seeing as a tool for 
external image manipulation. Recent huge food safety and eco scandals demonstrated that such 
schemes could often fail (high bounded rationality and opportunism). In any case, voluntary 
initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire demand especially if they require significant costs. 
                                                                                                                                                              
companies dominate. In matured economies the agrarian assets are with more universal character and 
farm borders are greatly determined by the family borders, and more market and contract forms prevail. 
11 The unprecedented development of “codes of behaviors”, eco-labeling and branding, environmental 
cooperatives, and “green alliances” etc., all are good examples in that respect.  
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Some private modes could be employed if a high frequency (pay-back of investment is possible) 
and mutual assets dependency (thus incentive to cooperate) exists12. In these instances, unwritten 
accords, interlinking, bilateral or collective agreements, close-membership cooperatives, codes 
of professional behavior, alliances, internal organization, etc. are used. However, emerging of 
special large-members organizations for dealing with low appropriability would be very slow 
and expensive, and they unlikely be sustainable in a long run (“free riding” problem). Therefore, 
there is a strong need for a third-party public (Government, local authority, international 
assistance) intervention in order to make such transaction possible or more effective.  
For example, supply of environmental goods by farmers could hardly be governed through 
private contracts with individual consumers because of the low appropriability, high uncertainty, 
and rare character of transacting (high costs for negotiating, contracting, charging all potential 
consumers, disputing). At the same time, supply of additional environmental protection and 
improvement service is very costly (in terms of production and organization costs) and would 
unlikely be carried out on a voluntary basis. Besides, financial compensation (price-premium) of 
farmers by willing consumers through a pure market mode is also ineffective (high information 
asymmetry, enforcement costs, etc.).  A third-party mode with a direct Government involvement 
would make that transaction effective: on behalf of the consumers the Government agency 
negotiates with individual farmers “contracts for environment conservation and improvement 
service”, coordinates activities of various agents (including direct production management), 
provides public payments for compensation of farmers, and controls implementation of 
negotiated terms13.  
 
Effective modes for public intervention 
 
There is a big variety of possible forms for public intervention in market and private 
transacting. The comparative institutional analysis of public modes is to include: firstly, the 
correspondence of public involvement to the real needs of development and identified needs for 
a third party intervention in transactions (Table 1). Secondly, the comparative advantages of 
alternative modes for public involvements comprising all costs - direct (tax payer, assistance 
agency) expenses, and transacting costs of bureaucracy (coordination, stimulation, 
mismanagement), and costs for individuals’ participation and usage of public modes (expenses 
for information, paper works, payments of fees, bribes, etc.), and costs for public control and 
reorganization of bureaucracy. And third, the comparative efficiency of selected form and other 
feasible modes of governance - partnerships with private sector; property rights modernization 
etc. Accordingly, public intervention is to be initiated only if there is a net benefit - when effects 
are greater than additional (individual and social) costs for the third-party involvement.   
Depending on the uncertainty, frequency, and necessity for specific investment of public 
involvement there will be different the most effective forms (Table 2 presents an example with 
“environmental transactions”). Principally, the interventions with low uncertainty and assets 
specificity would require smaller Government organizations (more regulatory modes; general 
laws and contract enforcement). When uncertainty and assets specificity of transactions increases 
a special contract mode would be necessary - public contracts for provision of private services, 
public funding (subsidies) of private activities, temporary labor contract for carrying out special 
public programs, leasing out public assets for private management etc. And when transactions 
are characterized with high assets specificity, uncertainty and frequency then an internal mode 
                                                 
12 E.g. inter-dependency between a bee keeper and a neighboring orchard farm.   
13 Namely, public environmental contracts with individual farmers have been broadly used in EU as an 
effective form for governing the supply of environmental preservation and improvement services. 
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and bigger public organization would be necessary – e.g. permanent public employment 
contracts, in-house integration of crucial assets in a specialized state agency or public company.  
 
Table 2 Effective Modes for Public Intervention in Environmental Transactions* 
Level of Uncertainty, Frequency, and Assets specificity 
Low                                                                                                                            High 
New property 
rights 
Regulations Taxes Assistance and 
support 
Public 
provision 
Private rights on 
natural, biological, 
and environmental 
resources;  
Private rights for 
(non) profit 
management of 
natural resources;  
Tradable quotas 
(permits) for 
polluting;  
Private rights on 
intellectual 
agrarian property 
and origins; 
Private liability 
for polluting 
Quotas for emissions, and use of 
products and resources; 
Regulations for use of GM crops; 
Bans for use of certain inputs and 
technologies; 
Norms for nutrition and pest 
management; 
Regulations for water protection 
against pollution by nitrates; 
Regulations for biodiversity and 
landscape management;  
Licensing for water use; 
Quality and food safely standards; 
Standards for good farming 
practices; 
Mandatory (environmental) 
training; 
Certifications and licensing; 
Compulsory environmental 
labeling; 
Designating environmental 
vulnerable and reserve zone; 
Set aside measures; 
Inspections, fines and, ceasing 
activities 
Tax rebates, 
exception, 
and breaks; 
Environmen
tal taxation 
on emissions 
or products 
(pesticides, 
fertilizers); 
Levies on 
manure 
surplus; 
Tax or 
levies 
schemes on 
farming or 
export for 
funding 
(innovation, 
extension 
etc.) 
activities  
Recommendation and 
information; 
Demonstration; 
Direct payments and 
grants for 
environmental actions 
of farms and (farm, 
community etc.) 
organizations; 
Preferential credit 
programs; 
Environmental 
contracts; 
Government purchases 
(water and other limited 
resources); 
Price and farm support 
for eco-production; 
Funding of 
environment and 
management training 
programs of agrarian 
agents; 
Assistance in farm 
associations 
Research 
and 
development 
Extension 
and advise; 
Agro-market 
and know-
how 
information; 
Agro-
meteorologi
cal 
forecasts; 
Sanitary and 
veterinary 
control; 
Specialized 
(quasi) 
public 
agency or 
company; 
Pertaining 
“precaution 
principle” 
* Environmental transactions are associated with respecting environmental rights and improving 
environmental performance of agents. 
 
In the beginning, existing problems (difficulties, costs, failures) in organization of market 
and private transactions have to be specified. The appropriate government involvement would be 
to create environment for: decreasing uncertainty surrounding transactions, increasing their 
intensity; protecting and making less dependent private investments. For instance, State 
establishes and enforces quality and safety standards for farm inputs and produces, certifies 
service providers, regulates employment relations, transfer water management rights to farms 
associations, set up minimum farm gate-prices etc. All that facilitates and intensifies (market and 
private) transactions and increase sustainability.   
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability of transactions have to be 
considered. Low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified private rights. 
In some cases, the most effective government intervention would be to introduce and enforce 
new private property rights – e.g. rights on natural, biological, and environmental resources; 
tradable quotas for polluting; private rights on intellectual agrarian property and origins etc. That 
would be efficient when privatization of resources or introduction (and enforcement) of new 
rights is not associated with significant costs (uncertainty, recurrence, and level of specific 
investment are low). That Government intervention effectively transfers the organization of 
transactions into market and private governance, liberalizes market competition and induces 
private incentives (and investments) in certain activities (the matrix in Table 1). For instance, 
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tradable permits (quotas) are used to control the overall use of certain resource or level of a 
particular type of pollution14. They give flexibility allowing farmers to trade permits and meet 
own requirements (adjustment costs, specific conditions of production). That form is efficient 
when a particular target must be met, and progressive reduction is dictated through permits while 
trading allows compliance to be achieved at least costs (private governance). Such trading rights 
also allow market for environmental quality to develop15.  
In other instances, it would be efficient to put in place regulations for trade and utilization 
of resources and products – e.g. standards for labor (safety, social security), product quality, 
environmental performance, animal welfare; norms for using natural resources, GM crops, and 
(water, soil, air, comfort) contamination; ban on application of certain chemicals or technologies; 
foreign trade regimes; mandatory training and licensing of farm operators etc. Environmental 
regulations aim changing farmers behavior and restrict negative externalities. They make 
producers responsible for the environmental effects of their products or management of products 
uses (e.g. waste). This mode is effective when general improvement of performance is desired 
but it is not possible to dictate what changes (in activities, technologies) is appropriate for wide 
range of operators and environmental conditions (high uncertainty and information asymmetry). 
When level of hazard is high, outcome is certain and control is easy, and no flexibility exists (for 
timing or nature of required result), then ban or strict limits are the best solution. However, 
regulations impose uniform standards for all regardless of the costs for compliance (adjustment) 
and give no incentives to over-perform beyond a certain level.  
In other instances, using the incentives and restrictions of the tax system would be the most 
effective form for intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences (exception, breaks, credits) are 
widely used to create favorable conditions for development of certain (sub)sectors and regions, 
forms of agrarian organization, segment of population, or specific types of activities. 
Environmental taxation on emissions or products (inputs or outputs of production) is also applied 
to reduce use of harmful substances. For instance, taxes on pesticides and fertilizer are used in 
Scandinavian countries and Austria to decrease their application and environmental damaging 
impact. In Holland levies on manure surplus was introduced in 1998 based on levies for nitrogen 
and phosphorus surpluses above a levy free surplus per hectare. The system creates strong 
incentives to minimize leakages (and not just usage), and reduce flexibility to substitute taxable 
for non-taxable inputs. However, it is associated with significant administrative and private costs 
(ECOTEC, 2001). The environmental taxes impose the same conditions for all farmers using a 
particular input and give signals to take into account the “environmental costs” inflicted on the 
rest of society. Taxing is effective when there is close link between activity and environmental 
impact, and when there is no immediate need to control pollution or to meet targets for reduction. 
Tax revenue is also perceived to be important to maintain budget and activities of special (e.g. 
environmental) programs. However, an appropriate level of charge is required to stimulate 
desirable change in farmers behavior16. Besides, nitrogen emission can vary according to the 
conditions when nitrates are applied and attempting to reflect this in tax may result in complexity 
and high administrating costs. Distribution impact of such taxes must be socially acceptable, and 
implications for international competitiveness also taken into account.  
In some cases, public assistance and support to private organizations in the best mode for 
intervention. Large agrarian (rural) support and development programs have been widely used in 
all industrialized countries. They let “proportional” development of agriculture, improvement of 
farmers welfare (“income parity”), and in some instances undesired effects (over-intensification,  
                                                 
14 Manure production quotas in Holland until recently, water abstraction licenses and water rights trading 
in UK and Australia, nutrition trading schemes in some US river catchments, etc. 
15 Permits can be taken out of market raising environmental quality above the level “planned” level. 
16 In Scandinavia introduction of tax brought about reduce use of pesticide. In California the doubling of 
the rate in 1992 had no discernable effect on sales (low price elasticity of demand for pesticide) 
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environmental degradation, market distortions). The public financial support for environmental 
actions is the most commonly used instrument for improving environment performance of 
farmers. It is easy to find a justification of the public payments as a compensation for provision 
of “environmental service” by farmers. All studies shows that value placed upon landscape 
exceed greatly the costs of running the schemes. However, share of farms covers by the various 
agri-environmental support schemes is not significant since the voluntary (self-selection) 
character does not attract farmers with the highest environment enhancement costs (most 
intensive and damaging environment producers). In some cases, low-rate of farmers’ compliance 
with environmental contracts is a serious problem (Dupraz et al., 2004). That problem cannot be 
solved by higher administrative control (enormous enforcement costs) or introducing bigger 
penalty (politically and juridical intolerable). A disadvantage of “the payment system” is that 
once introduced it is practically difficult (“politically unacceptable”) to be stopped when goals 
are achieved or there are funding difficulties. Moreover, withdraw of subsidies may lead to 
further environmental harm since it would induce adverse actions (intensification, return to 
conventional farming). The main critics of the subsidies are associated with their “distortion 
effect”, negative impact on “entry-exit decisions” from polluting industry, unfair advantages to 
certain sectors in the country or industries in other countries, not considering the total costs 
(transportation and environmental costs, and “displacement effect” in other countries). It is 
estimated that agri-environmental payments are efficient in maintaining current level of 
environmental capital but less successful in enhancing environmental quality.  
Often providing public information, recommendations, training and education to farmers, 
other agrarian agents, and consumers are the most efficient. In some cases, pure public 
organization (in-house production, public provision) will be the most effective as in the case of 
agrarian research and education, agro-market information, agro-meteorological forecasts, border 
sanitary and veterinary control etc.  
Usually, the specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of 
public intervention. The necessity of combined intervention (governance mix) is caused by the 
complementarities (joint effect) of individual forms; possibility to get an extra benefits (e.g. 
“cross-compliance” requirement for participation in support programs); particularity of problems 
to be tackle; specific critical dimensions of governed transactions; uncertainty (little knowledge, 
experience) associated with the impact of new forms; capability of the Government to organize 
(administrative potential to control, implement) and fund (budget resources and/or international 
assistance) different modes; and not least important the dominating (right, left) policy doctrine.  
Besides, the level of effective public intervention (governance) depends on kind of the 
problem. There are public involvements which are to be executed at local (community, regional) 
level, while other requires nationwide governance. And finally, there are transactions, which are 
to be initiated and coordinated (governed) at international (regional, European Union, 
worldwide) level due to the strong necessity for trans-border actions (needs for cooperation in 
natural resources and environment management, exploration of economies of scale/scale, 
governing of spill-overs) or consistent (national, local) government failures.  
The public (regulatory, inspecting, provision etc.) modes must have built special 
mechanisms for increasing competency (decrease bounded rationality and powerlessness) of 
bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public at large as well as restricting possible 
opportunism (cheating, interlinking, abuse of power, corruption) of public officers and other 
participants. It could be made by training, introducing new assessment and communication 
technologies, increasing transparency (independent assessment and audit), and involving experts, 
beneficiaries, and interests groups in management of public modes at all levels. Furthermore, 
applying “market like” mechanisms (competition, actions) in public projects design, selection 
and implementation would significantly increase incentives and decrease the overall costs.  
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Principally, pure public organizations should be used as a last resort when all other modes 
do not work effectively. The “in-house” public organization has higher (direct and indirect) costs 
for setting up, running, controlling, reorganization, and liquidation. Unlike market and private 
forms there is not an automatic mechanism (competition) for sorting out the less effective 
modes17. Public “decision making” is required which is associated with high costs and time, and 
it is often influenced by strong private interests (power of lobbying groups, policy makers and 
their associates, employed bureaucrats). Along with the development of the general institutional 
environment (“The Rule of Law”) and measurement, communication etc. technologies, the 
efficiency of pro-market modes (regulation, information, recommendation) and contract forms 
would get bigger advantages over the internal less flexible public arrangements.  
Usually hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than pure public 
forms given the coordination, incentives, and control advantages. In majority of cases, 
involvement of farms, farms organizations and other beneficiaries increase efficiency - decrease 
asymmetry of information, restrict opportunisms, increase incentives for private costs-sharing, 
reduce management costs etc. For instance, a hybrid mode would be appropriate for carrying out 
the supply of non-food services by farmers such as preservation and improvement of 
biodiversity, and landscape, and historical and cultural heritages.18 That is determined by farmers 
information superiority, strong interlinks of activity with traditional food production (economy 
of scope), high assets specificity to the farm (farmers competence, high cite-specificity of 
investments to the farm and land), and spatial interdependency (need for cooperation of farmers 
at regional or wider scale), and not less important - farm’s origin of negative externalities. 
Furthermore, enforcement of most of the labor, animal welfare, biodiversity etc. standards is 
often very difficult or impossible at all. In all these cases, stimulating and supporting (assisting, 
training, funding) private voluntary actions are much more effective then mandatory public 
modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, and disputing costs.   
Anyway, if there is a strong need for a third-party public involvement but an effective 
government intervention is not introduced in a due time agrarian “development” would be 
substantially deformed (Government failure is possible). In Bulgaria for instance, there have 
been a great number of bad examples for Government under- and over-interventions in agrarian 
sector (Bachev and Tsuji, 2001). Consequently, primitive and uncompetitive small-scale 
farming; predominance of over-integrated and personalized exchanges; ineffective and corrupted 
agrarian bureaucracy; blocking out of all class of agrarian transactions (such as innovation and 
extension supply, long-term credit supply, supply of infrastructure and environmental goods); 
and development of large informal (gray) sector, all they have come out as a result. 
 
Conclusions: 
 
The comparative institutional (and transaction costs) analysis gives new tools to better 
understand driving factors, modes, and prospects of agrarian development. It also provides 
powerful means to assist the design of public policies and modes for public intervention as well 
as private contracts, organizations, and collective actions. In the traditional framework there is 
only one mechanism for governing of sustainable agrarian development. “Free market prices” 
(and market competition) effectively coordinate entire activity of resource owners, entrepreneurs, 
and consumers. Rare cases of market “failures” are recognized but perfect “government 
intervention” is seen as a remedy.  In the real agrarian economy, there are additional important 
factors affecting individual choice and agrarian sustainability (namely institutions and 
transacting costs), and a great variety of effective governing mechanisms. The specific 
                                                 
17 It is not rare to see highly inefficient but still “sustainable“ public organizations around the world. 
18 Environmental cooperatives are very successful in Holland and some EU countries (Hagedorn, 2002). 
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institutional environment is a crucial factor, which eventually determines the “type” of agrarian 
development. In the particular economic, institutional, natural etc. environment agrarian agents 
use or develop a great variety of effective (and thus highly sustainable) market and non-market 
modes to govern their relations. Accordingly, at any given period of time, farms of various type 
(subsistent, family, cooperative, corporative) and size could persist in agriculture.  
The analyses of institutional, behavioral, dimensional etc. factors of transaction costs 
identify an immense range of “market failures” associated with unspecified or badly specified 
property rights; inefficient public contract enforcement system; high uncertainty and asset 
specificity, and low appropriability of transactions. The economic agents deal with market 
deficiencies developing different private (bi-, tri-, multi-lateral) forms for effective transacting. 
Private sector also “fails” to organize some transactions at effective scale. Thus there is a strong 
need for a third-party public (government, international assistance etc.) involvement in agrarian 
sector. Different modes of public intervention (property rights modernization, regulations, 
support, public provision and organization, hybrid modes) are with unequal efficiency in the 
specific conditions of a particular country or region. Therefore, diverse set of institutions and 
governing arrangements could lead to the (universal) goals of sustainable development. On the 
other hand, sustainability could be significantly compromised if both market and private sector 
fails, and no effective public intervention takes place (government failure is feasible).  
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